김정은 시대의 북미 정상회담 연구

A Study on the North Korea-U.S. Summit in the Kim Jong-un Era: Focusing on the Two-Level Game Theory

This study aims to study North Korea-U.S. Summit during the Kim Jong Un era. For this, a more diversified approach to North Korea-U.S. negotiations is attempted through a two-sided game theory that considers both international and domestic dimensions at the same time in international negotiations. In Putnam’s two-level game theory, the U.S.-North Korea negotiations were analyzed in terms of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic institutions, and negotiators’ strategies. As a result, the U.S. maintained a tougher stance in negotiations with North Korea because it had a smaller win-set than North Korea. Also, the breakdown of the North Korea-U.S. negotiations was due to the lack of overlapping win-set between the two countries. The Hanoi summit broke down because of North Korea’s different stance on dismantling its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and the U.S. stance on proposing a road-map for dismantling nuclear weapons. Through analysis through two-level game theory, it can be expected that future U.S.-North Korea relations and negotiations will be carried out in conjunction with the domestic politics of the U.S. and the situation inside North Korea. In particular, with the launch of the new Biden administration in 2021, relations between the U.S. and North Korea have taken another turn. For the U.S.-North Korea negotiations to be successfully concluded, it will be important to read the domestic political situations of each country in the process of negotiations, an international political issue.