Although relative power has been a major concern in theories of international relations, it has not attracted much attention in explaining cooperation. Additionally, most game theory analyses on cooperation have not incorporated the power of actors in their analysis. Therefore, in order to tackle above problems, I not only take the propositions of power transition theory for combining the power into the explanation of cooperation, but also incorporate the power as an element in the game theoretical model. The results illustrate that the power of a nation or the exercising of power could have a significant influence on cooperation, depending on the type of relationship which exists between nations. Consequently, this article distinguishes itself from the existing analysis of international cooperation by emphasizing the role of relative power in relation to cooperation.
Ⅱ. Prospect Theory and Its Basic Logic
Ⅲ. Prospect Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Strong and Weak States
Ⅳ. Prisoner’s Dilemma and CFC Negotiation