Evaluating the Korean Bargaining Power: The Case of the Financial Crisis in 1997

Ten years ago, the Korean economy was seriously hit by the financial crises. During the crises, and in the process of bailout program negotiations, Korea faced lack of bargaining power vis－－vis the IMF and other international financial institutions. This paper tries to evaluate the overall Korean bargaining power during the crises, and to find out why the Korean bargaining power was so limited. This paper argues that procedural and structural constraints, lack of BATNA, time constraints, and domestic constraints lessened the Korean bargaining power during the financial crises. However, after some bailout programs by the IMF started, the Korean bargaining power was enhanced. Because of this, the Korean economy could recover from the crises earlier than expected. To assess the overall Korean bargaining power, this study suggests that scholars perform comparative studies on diverse types of negotiations done by the Korean government during the past 10 years.