14세기 초 두아의 ‘大和約’ 주도와 몽골제국

Du’a’s Promotion of ‘the Great Peace’ in the Early 14th Century and the Mongol Empire

This article was intended to explore the political changes during the early 14th century in Central Asia, especially the process, causes, and results of the decline of the existing Ögödei Ulus and the emergence of Chaghatai Ulus as the new victor. In most previous studies, researchers did not pay attention to the differences between Chaghatai Ulus during which Du’a came to power after Qaidu’s death and Ögödei Ulus during Qaidu’s regime, while they evaluated Chaghatai Ulus at this time as an “ally” or “vassal” of Ögödei Ulus. So the purpose of this study is to show the circumstances of Chaghatai Ulus from the mid-13th century to the early 14th century, identify the conflicts between Chaghatai Ulus and Ögödei Ulus, present the choices Du’a made to solve this problem and its influence on Chaghatai Ulus and the whole Mongol Empire. Qaidu, who rose up in opposion to Qubilai, occupied vast domain of Chaghatai Ulus and monopolized the right to reap the tax on the sedentary region in Central Asia. Du’a, who became khan with Qaidu’s help, urgently needed the economic interests from the sedentary region in order to maintain his status as khan. Therefore he was forced to turn his eyes toward the surrounding sedentary areas. In contrast with Qa’an Ulus, which adopted an uncompromising policy in the northwestern region and had little economic attraction as a sedentary region, it was relatively easy to invade Hülegü Ulus, and the border with Hülegü Ulus was a place to advance to Hindustan. However, Qaidu deployed Sarban, his own son, in the upper region of Amu Darya, because he wanted to dominate at the border with Hülegü Ulus. Du’a, because of this, not only suffered a serious loss of military strength, but also had a limited radius of action in that area. Also, he came to be in an inferior situation when it came to the acquisition and distribution of economic interests. Under these circumstances, Qaidu’s death changed the whole situation, and Du’a had to alter his existing stance. Du’a put a lot of effort to promote ‘the Great Peace’ among Mongol uluses to regain his power. After that, on the basis of Temür Qa’an’s edict, he made an attempt to recover Chaghatai Ulus’s old domain. Also, he forced Chapar, the new khan of Ögödei Ulus, to yield control over Khurasan. This demand naturally brought about Ögödei Ulus’s opposition and Du’a won through a united offense with Qa’an Ulus. Du’a could seize control of Central Asia through an acknowledgment of the authority of the Great Khan. After all, the territory of Chaghatai Ulus was expanded to Uighuristan, the upper region of Amu Darya and Ghazna. Also, the status of Du’a’s family rose to much greater esteem from his achievements. Furthermore, unlike previous khans in Chaghatai Ulus, every khan after Du’a continuously exchanged envoys with Qa’an Ulus and kept a positive relationship. These comings and goings of envoys involved paying a tribute and giving a reward, the approval of Chaghatai khan’s legitimacy by the Great Khan, and vigorous economic exchanges. In a wider perspective, Du’a’s gaining of power provided the opportunity for the restoration of friendship among the Mongol uluses. The Great Khan’s authority was recovered, although it was limited. Of course there were some conflicts among the uluses, but in comparison with those during Qaidu’s time they lasted for a very short period. We can find clear differences between the Chaghatai Ulus during which Du’a came to power in Central Asia and the Ögödei Ulus when Qaidu was alive. On this account, the Mongol Empire could shift from a period of division and confrontation to a time of harmony and amity.