우수한 경영자는 특수관계자 거래에서의 부당한 이익 추구를 통제하는가?

Do Excellent Managers Control the Pursuit of Unfair Profit in Related Party Transaction?

Purpose This study verified whether excellent managers control abnormal profit from related party transactions. Design/Methodology/Approach Based on a sample of 5,125 (firm-year) manufacturing firms listed on the domestic stock market from 2015 to 2019, a regression analysis was conducted to test the research hypotheses. Findings First, there was no relationship between managerial ability and profit from normal related party transactions, but as manager ability improved, abnormal related party transactions decreased. This means that management does not control the normal level of normal related party transactions, but rather controls abnormal related party transactions that arouse negative market interest. Second, the larger the abnormal related party profit, the higher the company s performance, but the significant relationship decreased as manager ability improved. This result means that a company increases profits through abnormal related party transactions, but a company with excellent management improves performance through transactions with third parties rather than related party transactions. Research Implications The contribution of this study is that manager ability plays a role as a control device for related party transactions. In other words, they clearly understand the negative impact of abnormal related party transactions on the value of the company and actively control it by exercising their abilities. Accordingly, companies will be able to improve performance through business activities with third parties rather than dealings with related parties, which have a negative impact on corporate value by employing excellent managers.