온라인쇼핑플랫폼의 경쟁우위요소와 균형 분석

An Economic Analysis of Platform Competition in Online Shopping Market: Search vs Delivery

Purpose This paper aims to analyze competition between two online shopping platforms. Each platform is equipped with individual advantageous factor, search or delivery. Design/Methodology/Approach We set up a platform competition model based on the Hotelling location model and characterize a Nash equilibrium. Buyer group of single-homing, seller group of multi-homing and two platforms live in a one-unit-long city. Two platforms intermediate two groups and charge fees by 1st degree price discriminatory schedule. Findings First, the platform with search-advantage dominates in buyer’s market and seller’s market as it catches up delivery networks. Second, the public revelation of search algorithm can prevent search-advantage’s dominance. However, the public revelation of search algorithm also runs a risk of favoring the delivery-advantaged platform when it keeps delivery-advantage. Third, buyers’ surplus is maximized when each market is separately dominated, buyer’s market by the search-advantaged platform and seller’s market by the delivery-advantaged. Research Implications Scope and timing of revealing search algorithm public need to be designed in harmony with magnitude of delivery advantage.