대학가의 피시방을 방문해보자. 첫 번째 피시방도 40분에 1000원, 두 번째 피시방도40분에 1000원, 피시방 사장님들끼리 약속이라도 한 듯 가격이 일치하는 것을 알 수 있다. 우리는 소비활동을 하며 ‘비슷한 가격’을 익숙하게 목격한다. 가령 동네 짜장면 가격은 어느 지역을 가나 비슷하다. 가격이 비싸지 않다면 우리는 흔쾌히 이 ‘가격’에 수긍할것이다. 그러나 가격이 갑자기 비싸게 느껴진다면 ‘왜 이렇게 다 같이 올랐지?’라는 생각이 드는 것이 자연스럽다.…
With the full Amendment of Korean Competition Law, attention is focused on whether the attitude of Supreme Court, which have been strict about the proof of collusion, will change. In this study, after examining the judgment trends of the Supreme Court focusing on the ramen collusion case, it is meaningful to conceptualize the ‘Dogma of Agreement’ formed by the Supreme Court in general and to examine future prospects through it. As a result of comparing cases of the United States and Europe and modeling collusion from an economic point of view, it was found that the Supreme Court has a strict dogma similar to the criminal law when dealing with competition law. In particular, it can be seen that, despite sufficient economic incentives, it far exceeds economic rationality and has an attitude that is strongly wary of type I errors. Therefore, the results of this study predict that despite the full Amendment of Korean Competition Law, which made it easier to prove agreement, it will still be difficult to prove collusion. Furthermore, according to this prospect, I would like to discuss that the economic analysis, which has functioned as a secondary factor, becomes important in advance, and the proof of collusion will be decided depending on it.
Ⅱ. 부당한 공동행위 : 합의의 도그마
Ⅲ. 대법원 2013두 25924 판결(이하 “라면담합사건”)
Ⅳ. 개정 공정거래법과 전망