사법부의 탄생 : 미합중국헌법 사법조항의 역사적 기원

The Birth of the Judicial Branch: Historical Origins of the Constitutional Provisions related to the Judiciary - Key Debates from the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia

이 논문은 미합중국헌법 사법조항의 역사적 기원을 필라델피아 제헌회의에서 논의된 기록을 통해 규명한 것이다. 첫째, 연방하급법원 설치에 관한 논의에서는, 전국의회가 그 재량에 따라 연방하급법원을 조직하도록 허용함으로써, 버지니아 안의 연방하급법원을 존속시키는 타협이 이루어졌다. 둘째, 법관임명권 배분에 관한 논의에서는, 1차적으로는 입법부 구성에 관한 대타협의 정치적 계산 아래, 집행수반 선거방식에 관한 제2의 대타협의 조건을 더하여, 대통령과 상원이 연방법관 임명권을 분점하는 타협이 이루어졌다. 셋째, 연방법관에게 종신임기와 고정보수를 보장함으로써, 의회의 간섭으로부터 그 독립을 지키는 데 대해서는, 대표들 간 큰 이견 없이 대체적인 내용에 합의가 이루어졌다. 넷째, 배심제 입헌에 관한 논의에서 대표들은, 형사사건 배심재판에서 재판장소를 제한하지 않고, 배심원 판단을 연방대법원의 상소대상으로 인정하며, 민사사건에서 배심재판을 인정하지 않는 등, 은밀한 방식으로 배심제를 약화시키려는 태도를 취했다. 다섯째, 법원의 위헌심사권에 관한 논의에서 대표들은, 최고법조항을 통해 우회적으로 또 불충분하게 이를 수용하는 입장을 취했다. 마지막으로 논문의 결론에서는, 미합중국헌법 사법조항의 입헌동기를 집단적·개인적·제도적 이익으로 구분하여 분석했다.

Article III, which vests the weakest and the least dangerous judicial power in federal courts, is the shortest vesting clause in the U.S. Constitution. In this paper, I traced the historic origins of the judiciary provisions in the U.S. Constitution back to the debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, and found some significant features. The inferior tribunals of the federal judiciary, at first, were struck out of the Virginia Plan by a narrow margin, but, by a transfer of their establishment from the Constitution to the discretion of the national legislature, the delegates revived them. Likewise, the delegates succeeded in sharing the power to appoint federal judges, which was at first given exclusively to the Senate, with the executive. The Connecticut Compromise, which altered the expectations of the delegates as to whether small or large states would dominate the Senate, was the main factor that resulted above changes in the constitutional provisions related to the federal judiciary. However, the delegates easily agreed that federal judges should enjoy tenure during good behavior, rather than serving a fixed term of years, and that Congress should be barred from diminishing the judges’ salaries during their terms in office, even after the compromise on congressional representation(the Connecticut Compromise). The delegates, having little confidence in the people themselves sitting on juries, inserted three provisions to undermine the jury system. First, jury trials in criminal cases were expressly guaranteed, but not required to be held in the vicinity of the crimes. Second, the express provision of juries in criminal cases suggested the presumption that they were not required in civil cases. Third, appeals were allowed on jury findings of fact. The power of judicial review was well known to the delegates and they undoubtedly expected federal courts to reject unconstitutional laws, but, fearing vigorous public protest, they did not want this power to be explicitly said in the document. This is why the delegates chose the supremacy clause as a substitute. In conclusion, I analyzed the motivations and motivational assumptions of the delegates in framing the constitutional provisions related to the judicial branch, classifying them into three categories, group interest, personal interest, and institutional interest. My opinion is that the collective interests of the small/large states were a much more important factor than the personal interests of the delegates themselves in the Federal Convention, and that the interests of soon-to-be national-level institutions could not possibly play a meaningful role in the constitution-making process.