중국 국유기업 민영화

Privatization of Chinese SOEs: The Transfer of Inefficiency or Effective Market Timing

본 연구는 1990년 1월 1일부터 2012년 12월 31일까지 중국 상하이 및 선전거래소에 상장된 중국 국유기업을 대상으로 사회주의 경제체제인 중국에서의 국유기업 민영화 결정과 관련하여 효율성 가설, 시장개방 가설, 연성예산제약 가설, 재정부담 가설 및 제약 가설을 검정하였으며, 시장경제하에서의 시장 타이밍의 역할에 대한 가설을 검정하였다. 연구 결과, 국유기업의 높은 부채비율은 적자기업에 있어서 민영화에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치며, 높은 PER 및 ROA 수준도 민영화에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 반대로 자유현금흐름 수준은 민영화에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 한편, 흑자기업의 높은 ROA는 민영화에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 전통적인 민영화 이유에 대한 가설은 전체적으로 기각되었으며, 부분적으로 효율성 가설, 재정부담 가설 그리고 시장개방 가설이 지지되었다. 시장 타이밍 및 시장개방 가설이 지지되고 있음을 미루어 볼 때 중국 국유기업의 민영화는 글로벌 자본시장 통합과 개발 등과 관련성이 더 크며, 이러한 과정에서 정부의 수입극대화보다는 민영화된 기업의 성공을 위하여 인수 주주, 경영진 등의 부담경감 차원에서 민영화 시점을 결정한 것으로 판단된다.

In this study, we test five sets of conventional theories with respect to privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the transitional economies like China: the efficiency hypothesis, the market liberalization hypothesis, the soft-budget hypothesis, and the financial liability hypothesis, and the constraint hypothesis, In addition, we propose and test another hypothesis of our own, namely the market timing hypothesis, based on the efficient or rational stock market timing behaviors of SOEs in privatization for their success of privatization and for the success of long-term investors as in the developed market economy. With 12,742 observations for most SOEs in China that went public on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) for the period 1990-2012, we perform empirical tests for the six hypotheses by using firm-level data and report the following findings. First, the likelihood of privatization for the whole sample increases with higher ROA, rejecting the efficiency hypothesis in that inefficient SOEs can improve their efficiency though privatization. While it decreases with ROA for the profitable firms, it increases with higher ROA for the unprofitable firms. For the separated groups, SOEs can improve their efficiency for better ROAs though privatization, supporting the efficiency hypothesis. Second, the results are mostly same in the models with net income level instead of profitability, which is related to the financial liability hypothesis. Third, the likelihood of privatization for the whole sample increases for firms during the years of stock market liberalization for foreign investors, supporting the market liberalization hypothesis, also for both profitable firms and unprofitable ones. Fourth, the likelihood of privatization for the whole sample increases for firms with positive free cash flows, rejecting the soft budget constraint hypothesis, also for both profitable firms and unprofitable ones. Fifth, the likelihood of privatization for the whole sample increases for firms with higher debt leverage, which is against the constraint hypothesis. While it increases with higher debt ratio for the profitable firms, it decreases with higher debt ratio for the unprofitable firms, the latter supporting the hypothesis. Basically, the conventional hypotheses are mostly rejected as a whole, especially with respect to the soft budget constraint hypothesis while efficiency hypothesis and financial liability hypothesis are supported for profitable firms only, although the market liberalization hypothesis is evidenced to support the effects of the government regulation to expedite privatization of SOEs prior to market liberalization in more recent years. Unlike conventional privatization theories on SOEs in the economies of transition, the test results fully support our market timing for the whole sample and for both profitable firm group and non-profitable firm group. Thus, the central Chinese government or local ones support the privatized firms and public investors by finding appropriate market timing with relatively at a lower PER or stock price level relative to EPS in order to the financial burden of buyers of the government.