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Nietzsche and Interpretationism: The Origin of Interpretationism and the Problem of Reality

The main argument of modern interpretationism is that cognition is nothing but an identification of ‘something as something’, i.e. a classification of something strange into a well-known system of ideas. The standpoint like this is, however, nothing new at all. Earlier Kant, as well as Nietzsche, has held such a view. He explicated clearly that cognition is a “subsumption” of data under the categories, while Nietzsche understood it as an ascription of something strange to something well known or a well-known idea. They spoke about “Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erfahrung” and “Perspektiven-setzende Kraft”, and regarded it as a interpretation's frame a priori. Since interpretation always presupposes a reference to the interpretandum, interpretationism takes an realistic position in oder that the world interpreted should not be a daydream or castle in the air. Kant and Nietzsche are realists insofar as they recognize an outside world independent of the subject. Kant regarded the affection by thing-in-itself as a different kind of causality from the one in the sphere of phenomenon, while Nietzsche found the cause of affection in a psychological association. Interpretationists create theoretical constructs which is necessary for the process of interpretation. These are called “ideas of reason” by Kant, whereas “fictions” by Nietzsche. Such theoretical constructs as “wimp”, “axion”, “Big bang”, and “energy” in oriental medicine have objectiv reality, only in case they bear relations with valid laws of experience such as the law of causality and the law of conservation of mass and energy.