상세검색
최근 검색어 전체 삭제
다국어입력
즐겨찾기0
커버이미지 없음
KCI등재 학술저널

니체와 해석주의

해석주의의 기원과 실재성 문제

The main argument of modern interpretationism is that cognition is nothing but an identification of ‘something as something’, i.e. a classification of something strange into a well-known system of ideas. The standpoint like this is, however, nothing new at all. Earlier Kant, as well as Nietzsche, has held such a view. He explicated clearly that cognition is a “subsumption” of data under the categories, while Nietzsche understood it as an ascription of something strange to something well known or a well-known idea. They spoke about “Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erfahrung” and “Perspektiven-setzende Kraft”, and regarded it as a interpretation's frame a priori. Since interpretation always presupposes a reference to the interpretandum, interpretationism takes an realistic position in oder that the world interpreted should not be a daydream or castle in the air. Kant and Nietzsche are realists insofar as they recognize an outside world independent of the subject. Kant regarded the affection by thing-in-itself as a different kind of causality from the one in the sphere of phenomenon, while Nietzsche found the cause of affection in a psychological association. Interpretationists create theoretical constructs which is necessary for the process of interpretation. These are called “ideas of reason” by Kant, whereas “fictions” by Nietzsche. Such theoretical constructs as “wimp”, “axion”, “Big bang”, and “energy” in oriental medicine have objectiv reality, only in case they bear relations with valid laws of experience such as the law of causality and the law of conservation of mass and energy.

1. 들어가는 말

2. 초월철학과 포섭적 인식론

3. 니체의 해석이론과 관점주의

4. “이성이념들”과 “허구들”의 실재성 문제

5. 맺는 말

참고문헌

로딩중