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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS Vol.33 No.3.jpg
SCOPUS 학술저널

A Note on Reputation in Noisy Cheap Talk

A Note on Reputation in Noisy Cheap Talk

We revisit Morris (2001) two-period advice game but with communication error, and investigate how communication error affects the advisor’s reputational incentives and thus her information transmission. Reputational incentives differ from Morris (2001) and critically depend on the structure of noise and specific equilibrium strategies. We borrow the notion of “plausible deniability” by Blume et al. (2019) and explain the effects of communication error on information transmission and welfare. We show that the weakened reputational incentives reduce the good type advisor’s incentive to lie, compared to Morris (2001).

1. INTRODUCTION

2. RELATED LITERATURE

3. MORRIS (2001)’S ADVICE GAME WITH NOISY SIGNAL

4. REPUTATION IN THE ADVICE GAME WITH COMMUNICATION ERROR

5. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

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