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한국중동학회논총 제43권 제3호.jpg
KCI등재 학술저널

무하사사 타이피야 체제로 보는 협의주의의 적용과 한계

Application of Consociationalism by the Muhasasa Ta'ifiya System and Its Limitations: Focused on the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary Election Case

The post-Ba’th Party Iraqi political system accepted consociationalism, which guarantees the participation of conflicting groups in the government, as an irreplaceable alternative way of peacebuilding, rather than integrationism, which favors majority rule to integrate various groups within a country. The characteristics of the majority model of Westminster democracy, which is regarded as integrationism, are competition and exclusion, but consociational model emphasizes participation, negotiation, and compromise. Muhasasa Taifiya is a power-sharing system known as consociationalism and has been adopted as the basis for the establishment to be a sectarian apportionment of political positions since when the US-led Iraqi government was formed in 2003. The 2021 Iraqi parliamentary election revealed the sectarian conflict between Iraq's Shi'ites groups. The principle of majority rule envisioned by Sadr, who won the 2021 election, was essentially a partially adopted consociationalism that attempted to exclude the rival Shia faction from the government plan. As a result, Maliki and the Coordination Framework, rival Shia coalition that have been given legitimacy for political power based on Muhasasa, were given opportunities to continue to maintain consociationalism and come to power. Enforceable compromise between consociationalism rule and majority rule in Iraq's current institutions are expected to be limited.

Ⅰ. 연구 제안

Ⅱ. 협의주의의 이론적 논의와 채택 과정

Ⅲ. 무하사사 타이피야 체제로 보는 이라크 협의주의 비판

Ⅳ. 2021 총선 후 정치 위기로 본 협의주의의 적용과 한계

Ⅴ. 결론

참고문헌

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