Adverse Inferences as Sanctions in International Arbitration

Adverse Inferences as Sanctions in International Arbitration

International arbitration is a widely preferred alternative dispute resolution mechanism for many desirable characteristics, such as, party autonomy, procedural flexibility, ability of parties to select their arbitrators, as well as, finality of arbitral awards, among others. However, because arbitral tribunals derive their authority and jurisdiction from the parties’ agreement(s) to arbitrate their dispute(s), arbitral tribunals lack coercive powers that national courts have. At times, arbitral tribunals have to deal with circumstances of non-production and/or spoliation of evidence, and due to the lack of coercive authority, it may be challenging to compel such recalcitrant parties to produce the relevant evidence and/or witnesses. Therefore, adverse inferences drawn against the recalcitrant parties may be the most effective sanctions. This article explores the sources of authority for arbitral tribunals to make such adverse inferences and argues for a precise set of rules or standard to be consistently applied by the arbitral tribunals in order to increase predictability in arbitral proceedings. Additionally, some of the critical issues when considering adverse inferences as sanctions are discussed.