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KCI등재 학술저널

Arbitrator’s Reputation and PR Cost: A Signaling Approach

Arbitrator’s Reputation and PR Cost: A Signaling Approach

DOI : 10.16998/jas.2023.33.3.129
  • 14

We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator’s marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Background

Ⅲ. Model

Ⅳ. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria

Ⅴ. Refinement of Separating Equilibria

Ⅵ. Comparative Statics

Ⅶ. Conclusion

References

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