Reunifying Korea: Challenges, Uncertainties, and an Agenda for US-ROK Cooperation
Reunifying Korea: Challenges, Uncertainties, and an Agenda for US-ROK Cooperation
- 한국전략문제연구소
- 전략연구
- 통권 제61호(특별호)
- 2014.02
- 191 - 218 (28 pages)
The peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a major strategic goal of the Republic of Korea -- one that is shared by the United States. Realizing Korea’s reunification under Seoul’s lead would eliminate the greatest threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Appealing though that prospect may be, it is difficult today to envision a near-term path to Korea’s national reunification. The greatest obstacle to reunification is North Korea itself, particularly the regime’s determination to retain its militant, totalitarian system. The ROK has long viewed reunification as the end product of a process of reconciliation with a transformed, moderate North Korea. However, North Korea should not be expected to transform itself into an entity to be absorbed by the Republic of Korea. Nor will it give up its own vision of unification, which involves the eradication of the South’s political, social, and economic systems. Forcing reunification on the North is not an option, and would only invite chaos and conflict. And we must not underestimate the North Korean regime’s capacity for survival, driven in large part by its ideological fervor, military capabilities, and the support of China. But North Korea is not without its vulnerabilities. The purge and execution of Jang Song Taek exposed a major fissure inside the regime -- a challenge so great that the leadership had to use extraordinary measures to remove it. Those measures could prove the regime’s undoing, as they have destroyed the North Korean leadership‘s aura of infallibility. The Jang affair may have revealed how little we know about Pyongyang’s internal dynamics, but it has also taught us that we cannot rule out the possibility of major change in North Korea. North Korea’s greatest vulnerabilities may lie in the rising international indignation over its human rights record and growing concern over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. International opprobrium has the potential to further isolate and weaken the regime, including by applying new sanctions targeting Pyongyang’s banking and financial links with the outside world. Creating the conditions for broad reconciliation with the North and the eventual reunification of Korea will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the foreseeable future. Faced with this situation, the ROK should seek to influence North Korean behavior on the margins, guard against provocation, adhere to its democratic principles, build its strength, and exercise patience. At the same time, the ROK and the United States should cooperate to erode the DPRK’s strengths, take advantage of its vulnerabilities, and use diplomacy and pressure to press Pyongyang to follow a more cooperative path. Such an approach should seek to shape North Korea’s strategic environment and choices in a way that maximizes prospects for a future transformation of the DPRK regime. That new policy approach, described in detail in this paper, includes a reinvigorated sanctions regime, a U.S.-ROK-PRC dialogue on the future of the Korean Peninsula, and ROK diplomacy designed to increase international support for Korea’s reunification. The approach would test Pyongyang’s willingness to pursue reconciliation and hold the door open to dialogue with the North if it is prepared to forego provocations and deal with the international community’s concerns about its WMD and missile programs. Change, whether the result of external pressure, instability, or the need to avoid internal chaos, is coming to North Korea. However it comes, it should hasten the day when Korea’s long-hoped-for national reunification becomes a reality.
Ⅰ. The Unification Imperative
Ⅱ. The Challenging Path to National Reunification
Ⅲ. North Korea After Jang: A Firm Foundation Or Feet of Clay?
Ⅳ. Regime Strengths and Vulnerabilities
Ⅴ. Recommendations: A U.S.-ROK Agenda for Dealing with Pyongyang