[특집]북한안보보장에 따른 한반도 안보 영향 평가 및 대책

North Korea Security Assurance: Assessment and Countermeasure

With respect to offering security assurance to North Korea, the following options can be considered: 1) U.S. unilateral declaration, 2) U.S.-DPRK joint declaration, 3) multilateral declaration, 4) U.S.-DPRK non-aggression treaty, and 5) ROK-DPRK or multilateral peace treaty. Whatever the option, however, it is evident that any form of security assurance given to North Korea would inevitably affect our own security environment. Thus, it is imperative for us to make an extensive effort to minimize any negative impact on our security environment. Nevertheless, security assurance to North Korea will be a motive to fundamentally change the security context of the Korean peninsula in the long run. And, we should make good use of this change as an opportunity to make a more stable and robust security environment. In this sense, therefore, the following principles must be carefully observed when we consider providing security assurance to North Korea. First and foremost, security assurance to North Korea must be pursued upon condition that the North Korean nuclear issue is completely settled. While the North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved, and especially when Pyongyang grudgingly concedes to accept nuclear freeze only, we should not offer any security assurance. However, it can be considered as an alternative that depending upon the progress of North Korean nuclear settlement, the degree of security guarantee may be gradually increased from a form of declaration to a form of written assurance or treaty that has legally binding force. Second, security assurance should be pursued in a way to improve our security environment. In other words, offering security assurance to North Korea should not undermine or even threaten our national security. Rather, it should be pursued in such a manner that it not only improves our security environment but also promotes a long-term peace on the Korean peninsular and the region as a whole. Third, security assurance should take a multilateral format, in which ROK and other regional powers participate as signatories rather than U.S.-DPRK bilateral agreement. In case of bilateral agreement, no matter what kind of form is to be taken, it might create significantly damaging political impacts upon the future of ROK-U.S. alliance and United States Forces in Korea (USFK). Fourth, the surest way to minimize any adverse effects and to give substantial security guarantee to North Korea is to relate (link up) security assurance with the process of establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. It is to note that if we are to offer security assurance to North Korea, it is because we want a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. Therefore, any security assurance can be given only when Pyongyang's nuclear programs are completely dismantled. North Korea has tried so-called 'salami tactics' meaning that it breaks down as many steps as possible in its nuclear negotiation process. Judging from what North Korea has insisted until the thirdround of Six-Party Talks in June 2004, Pyongyang wants to restore the Geneva Agreed Framework, in which it received compensations for its nuclear freeze as a last step of nuclear settlement. That is, North Korea not only still refuses the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of nuclear programs (also called CVID principle) requested by ROK, U.S. and Japan but also denies its HEU program, which is the focal point of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. For this reason, we must make the complete dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programs as an (absolute) condition of providing a security assurance to North Korea. And, as a means to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear programs (ambition), a gradual, (step-by-step) approach can be considered. The implementation procedures are as follows. In the first phase, in conjunction with the North's expression (demonstration) of its willingness to freeze and dismantle nuclear progr