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KCI등재 학술저널

[특집] 한반도 군비통제와 한미협력

ROK-U.S.Cooperation for Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

Given the intractability of the North Korean nuclear problem, there is no simple or singular response we can give, such as “dialogue” or “the military option.” What is required is a response or collection of responses that would be capable of dealing with several consequences, in a way that will increase the intensity of the responses, and with an ultimate view of resolving the issue in a more or less fundamental way. It goes without saying that peace and the security interests of the six parties should be well protected. First, close cooperation and coordination among the allies, particularly the Republic of Korea and the United States is highly important. No strategy will succeed without the shared views, interest, and strategy of the allies. This requires not only hammering out common ground between those whose interests may differ but, more importantly, working out strategies and responses that could be the product of joint brain-storming sessions. Secondly, unlike 10 years ago, we have to be prepared now to deal with both possibilities that the issue can be resolved through negotiation or that North Korea will end up with a nuclear power status. We cannot afford to wait, as we did earlier, to find out if our “negotiation first” roadmap will work and then decide what step we would take next. We must prepare now to deal with either eventuality. Thirdly, even when a multilateral approach is adopted, we cannot expect every country to play roles on the same level. clearly, the United States and South Korea will have to share the major burden of providing either the carrot or the stick of inducing North Korea to respond. Other countries including Japan, China, and Russia will have their respective roles and functions cut out for them Fourthly, in the debate on carrot and stick, some tend to rule out the former and others rule out the latter. The debate is particularly divided on the issue of the use of military force. It is both understandable and natural that South Koreans, whether they actually believe it or not, appear highly reluctant to entertain the idea of sticks and sanctions, much less the use of force, in dealing with the issue. Open debate on the issue, however, seems unproductive, if not counterproductive. It would be useful to leave all possibilities open and keep North Korea guessing rather than reassuring it in advance that it can act with impunity under any circumstances. Finally, any deal involving North Korea and on the nuclear issue in particular is likely to be a “package deal.” The only question is how large the package is and whether the implementation will be a one-shot, simultaneous arrangement, or in stages, as a staggered series of unilateral actions. Obviously, North Korea wants a big package to be carried out in as simultaneous and sweeping a way as possible. But, we need to explore a more thorough, cheat-proof anti-proliferation regime, something North Korea will want to resist as much as possible. Otherwise, North Korea will be tempted to cheat again. Above all, it is important that South Korea and the United States send a clear message to North Korea that WMD, missiles, and conventional threat issues should be resolved in a comprehensive manner. The Bush administration is likely to embark on the readjusting process of overseas U.S. troops in order to make them “lighter and faster.” It was proven, through the Afghan war, that air power combined with small number of special ground forces would be the most effective for anti-terror military operations conducted in a large scale. If the force structure of overseas U.S. troops is changed to the air and naval power-oriented one, the ground forces of the USFK would be downsized, which will give rise to arms control debates on the Korean peninsula.

Ⅰ. 머리말

Ⅱ. 북한의 WMD 문제와 한미협력

Ⅲ. 북한의 재래식 위협 문제와 한미협력

Ⅳ. 국제군비통제와 한미협력

Ⅴ. 맺음말

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