September 11 has focused u.s. security interests for our time, much as December 7 did two generations ago. The renewed focused on security relationships did not begin on September 11, 2001. The Bush Administrations security agenda was outlined in September 1999. Since September 11 the pace of consultation abroad and transformation at home has accelerated. At the dawn the 21st Century, we have the challenge of dealing with new actors on the world stage both state and non-state forces. How the industrial democracies deal with these emergent forces is likely to define the history of the 21st Century. The United States has a lead position among the industrial democracies, but must adjust its approach, capabilities, and activities to deal with the new realities of our world security. The industrial democracies are not only independent nations, but also most importantly interdependent nations. Our strength and security are the greater because of our partners. This paper examines the evolution of the Bush Administration's Asia policy from before he took office through the aftermath of September 11. The September 11 attack has had a significant impact on the U.S. defense posture, including missile defense, homeland security, and force transformation and also on the willingness of the American public and Congress to pursue a more focused, forceful security and foreign policy. We also consider budgetary issues in the heightened security environment. Then in conclusion, we address the implications for the U.S.-ROK security alliance. Three themes run through this paper: ■ The Bush Administrations assessment of security threats and approach to defense transformation, articulated in 1999, well pre-dated September 11. ■ The September 11 attacks and subsequent response are tragic confirmation of the earlier statements that the security threats of the 21st century will be broader, more varied, less predictable than those of the 20th century. Addressing these so-called asymmetric threats requires a major restructuring, reorganization of military forces. ■ The September 11 attacks did not change the direction of defense transformation, but rather provided the political and budget support to accelerate it. The Bush Administration came to office facing great challenges in foreign and security policy. In the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, there was serious indecision as to the appropriate future U.S. military role in world affairs, and as to the most appropriate types of forces and equipment. The 1997 National Defense Panel (NDP) stressed the importance of transformation of the military and the need to reduce funding for legacy system; in order to provide new capabilities to confront anticipated asymmetrical threats. The Congress and the Clinton Administration did not make the hard decisions called for by the National Defense Panel. On the Korean Peninsula, the Clinton Administration welcomed the Sunshine Policy of Korean President Kim Dae Jung, but then interfered with President Kims bold initiative by seeking direct Washington-Pyongyang dialogue. President Bush and his foreign and security policy teams are much focused on Asia and its so-called crescent of concern from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straits down through the Philippines and Indonesia, stretching eastward to the India-Pakistan confrontation, Iran, and Iraq. While strongly asserting U.S. interests President Bush and his security policy team reach out for effective consultation with allies and friends. 1. Defense Transformation To the surprise of many in Washington, President Bush did not add large amounts to the DoD budget in early 2001, insisting instead on an intense review of requirements before making funding proposals. His initial defense budget proposed a $20 billion budget increase in Mense R&D between 2002 and 2006. In addition, he reaffirmed his intention to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as po
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 미국의 대아시아 정책발전과정
Ⅲ. 미국의 군사력 변화
Ⅳ. 미국의 국방예산
Ⅴ. 한ㆍ미 동맹에 대한 함의
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