상세검색
최근 검색어 전체 삭제
다국어입력
즐겨찾기0
학술저널

[특집] 남북 정상회담 이후 북한의 군비 통제 문제에의 접근 및 방향 분석

The Prospect of Arms Control in The Korean Peninsular after the Inter-Korean Summit: North Korea's approach to Arms Control Issues

  • 3
한국전략문제연구소_전략연구.jpg

The historic inter-Korean summit meeting of June 2000 and its adoption of the Joint Declaration have opened a new chapter in inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation. The first meeting of the Defense Minister in Cheju Island in September 2000 also has an important meaning to initiate a process of dialogue on strategic concerns. However. there is no reference to the development of military CEMs. which can directly contribute to tension reduction between the two parts of Korea. Despite the summit and improved inter-Korean relations, both Koreas have not shown any fundamental changes in their threat perception. force structure, deployment patterns, and military planing since the summit. Although there are some signs of tension reduction evidenced through the ban on propaganda warfare along the DMZ, the first inter-Korean defense ministerial talk, and the partial removal of mines in the DMZ for the reconstruction of the Seoul-Shinuiju railway system, both Koreas still consider each other principal enemies, and strategic and tactical doctrines have not been changed. North Korea still maintains its offensive deployment along the DMZ, and is known to have engaged in massive military maneuvers since the summit, heightening security concerns of South Korea and the United States. One of the most significant outcomes of the summit is the North Korea's tacit recognition of American forces in the south, Departing from its rigid stance that emphasizes the unconditional withdrawal of American forces from the South, Chairman Kim recognized the instrumental value of American forces as balancer of regional order. However. the advent of the Bush administration complicates the environment surrounding U. S. forces in Korea. Mter reviewing U.S. policy towards North Korea. President Bush announced on June 6 that the US would restart negotiations With North Korea on a broad range of issues. including North Korea's Production and exporting of missiles and its deployment of soldiers on the ROK border. He had directed his national security team to “undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda” that included “verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports. and a less threatening conventional military posture.” He said one of his goals was to allow North Korea to “demonstrate the seriousness of its desire for improved relations.” North Korea. in its first official response to the talks. has dismissed a US Bush administration request that the issue of conventional forces be included along with questions of nuclear and ballistic missile control. North Korea also said that the talks should focus on US compensation for delays in the provision of two nuclear reactors. A North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesman accused President Bush of setting the agenda for the talks unilaterally and said the US must remove its troops before any discussion of North Korea's troop deployments. It is apparent that North Korea's insistence of withdrawal of U.S. troops is closely related to conventional arms control raised by the Bush administration. The basic postures of North Korea on arms control were primarily threefold: withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South: denuclearization of the Korean peninsula: and reduction of standing armed forces on each side to a specific ceiling such as 100.000 troops. Although it is true that the historic South-North summit and the first inter-Korean defense ministerial talk contributed tension reduction as well as political confidence building, North Korea unilaterally has suspended the dialogue Vilith the South along the advent of the Bush administration. The Kim Jung-il regime would need time to review its policy directions due to the change of strategic environments such as the Bush administration's firm attitude towards North Korea, difficult situations of South Korea's economy and incoming of season of South Korea's presidential elect

Ⅰ. 문제의 제기

Ⅱ. 북한 군축제의의 변화 추이

Ⅲ. 남북정상회담과 국방장관 회담

Ⅳ. 정상회담이후 한반도 환경평가

Ⅴ. 북한의 군비통제 접근 방향 전망

Ⅵ. 결어:우리의 대응방향

(0)

(0)

로딩중