[특집] 러시아의 새로운 안보전략과 극동지역 재평가

Russia's New Security Strategy and Its Reassessment of the Far East

Under Russia's second president, Vladimir Putin, the country's foreign and security policy has become more active and coherent. Early in his term, Mr.Putin approved a set of documents, such as the national security and foreign policy concepts, the military and naval doctrines, etc., designed to provide guidelines in those areas. Interesting from an analytical perspective, these blueprints nevertheless fail to give a sense of direction, especially for the longer term. Moscow policymakers have not yet made a fundamental choice among the three main options available: restoring Russia as an independent great power; turning Russia into a revisionist power seeking to overturn the results of the Cold War; and, lastly, integration with the West. In practice, elements of all three approaches can be detected in Russia's policy moves, as is evidenced by its policies toward the CIS and its individual member nations; the European Union and NATO; China, India, Iran and Iraq. Although thoroughly feasible for the near and medium term, such a combination is not sustainable over the longer period. Russia will have to assume a new international identity and anchor itself somewhere. Both domestic and external factors are hard at work to ensure that this happens sooner rather than later. This is where Asia comes in. The fate of some three quarters of Russia r s territory lying east of the Urals is the most important geopolitical challenge facing Russia. Deindustrialization, and especially depopulation are very serious trends which can not be easily reversed. Russia will need to come up with a new model for developing its vast Asiatic territories if she does not want to lose them, or at least lose control over them. In the author's view, this is only possible through opening up Siberia and the Far East to the Asia-Pacific. This would require from Russia to make itself attractive to foreign capitals, technologies and workers. The latter will be almost exclusively Asian, mostly Chinese, but also Korean, Vietnamese et al. Rather than protecting itself against Asian migration, an enlightened Russian government would need to work out a set of policies aimed at regulating immigration into Russia and naturalization. Implementing these policies will not be an easy task, but the alternative will probably be an uncontrolled process leading to ethnic tensions and even inter-state conflicts. Such an approach is key to dealing with Russia's China problem, which consists in the fundamental change in the positions the two countries have in Asia. Russia has no experience of dealing with a dynamic, forward-looking and powerful China which seeks to establish itself as a natural center of gravity on the continent. Instead of proceeding from a position of strength, Moscow will need to accept the asymmetries which are growing, and learn to practice the fine art of balancing its great neighbor, even as it enters into a more intimate relationship with it. For the foreseeable future, the attention of China's strategists will be concentrated on Taiwan. The relationship between the mainland and the island may evolve peacefully, with the problems competently managed rather than resolved. Should there be a conflict, however, other nations can be implicated. In the 1990s, Russia became the main supplier of arms and weapons technology to China, with the level of sophistication of its arms sales steadily increasing. In a conflict involving China and the United States this may put Moscow before an agonizing choice. Heeding Washington's demands and staying away would be saving trouble for Sino-Russian relations later; siding with China would be a total and complete disaster. Thus, much more caution in the arms trade is needed even now. China is not the only pillar of Russia's Asia policy, but she shouldn't be more than first among the three equals, the other two being Japan and India. In particular,