[특집] 남북한간 실질적 군비통제 방안

Realistic Approach Toward Inter-Korean Arms Control

Although almost ren years have passed away since the talks of arms control between two Koreas began, there are very few things we have achieved. And, inter-Korean arms control has gone nowhere. To make a breakthrough in a deadlock in inter-Korean arms control it is necessary to understand the characreristics of arms control on the Korean Peninsula. First, the existing difference between the two Koreas in threat perception limits the scope of common interests and common threats. Consequently, this difference constrains the possibility of arms control which can be looked upon as a way to reduce rension by controlling each one's armed forces. Second, since the main target of arms control is both sides' conventional forces, it is difficult to calculate, compare, and contrast armed forces of the two Koreas. Third, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea makes the inter- Korean arms control difficult and complex since the involvement of the United States in the negotiation is required Fourth, taking the geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula into account, the positions of neighboring countries concerned must be reflecred. Finally, the lack of arms control experience between the two Korea makes the inter-Korean arms control more difficult. That is, political reconciliation--one of preconditions for arms control--does not exist on the Korean Peninsula and arms control itself has been abused for political/diplomatic propaganda. To devise realist arms control approach, it is necessary to review North Korea's policy on arms control North Korea has been persistently proposing the followings. a) withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea: b) conclusion of peace treaty between the United States and North Korea: c) reduction of both Korea's troops to 100,000: d) conclusion of non-aggression treaty between the two Koreas: e) stopping of military exercises and training with foreign troops: and f) prohibition of weapons import. Since the late 1980s, North Korean proposals have become more sophisticated by including some confidence-building measures (CBMs). North Korea calls it “comprehensive peace proposal” which is a part of their strategy of unifying Korea--Koryo Confederacy. For North Korea, arms control is a political means toward South Korea, not necessarily a means to stabilize military situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has persistently demanded the withdrawal of USFK from the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for arms control talks between the two Koreas. This means that threat to North Korea's security is coming from the possibility of U.S. involvement, not directly from South Korea's armed forces. Thus, they intend to eliminate the source of threat. Third, North Korean arms control proposal focuses on troop reduction, rather than equipment, to maintain its strategic leverage due to its ability to mobilize huge forces in short notice. South Korea's arms control proposal is quite similar to that of European case: that is, CBMs first, arms limitation second, and finally arms reduction. While South Korean arms control proposal has its own logic and rationale, it lacks validity since it does not take into account the issue of feasibility. To make a progress in arms control on the Korean Peninsula, a set of conditions must be met and South Korea should try to consolidate these conditions. First, since North Korea mainly relies on its military assets in negotiating with South Korea as well as other outside world, North Korea's military leverage must be neutralized. Only when North Korea sees no utility of military tools, or furthermore counterproductive, it can seriously consider arms control as a way of saving itself. Second, under any circumstances, it must not be allowed for North Korea to acquire WMD. If North Korea acquires or enhances its WMD capabilities, it would eliminate possibility of inter-Korean arms control since it would only enhance the utility of military means.