[특집] 새롭게 등장하는 러시아의 안보관심과 극동군사력의 장래

Deadlock or New Departure: the Future Direction of Russian Military Forces in the Far East.

지난 백수십년동안 중국과 한국의 정치적, 군사적 취약성이 동아시아의 전략적 상황의 중요한 하나의 특성이었다. 그들의 취약성이 바로 태평양의 “강자” 일본과 미국, 러시아/소련이 중국과 한국에 수없이 개입하고 간섭 하도록 한 이유였다. 1970년대 말까지 동아시아에서의 거의 모든 중요한 분쟁이나 갈등은 직접, 또는 간접으로 강국들이 약국에 대하여 정치적 영향력을 확보하기 위해서 경쟁한 결과 야기되었다. 이러한 과거에 비추어 볼 때 전략적 관점에서 1990년대는 동아시아의 역사에서 하나의 분수령이라고 할 수 있다. 그 이 유는 미국과 일본, 그리고 러시아의 정치가들과 전략가들이 1990년대 미국과 일본, 그리고 그들의 전략을 세울 때 이제는 강력한 중국과 번영되고 단결 러시아의 정치가들과 전략가들 된 한국이라는 상황을 고려하여야 하게 되었기 때문이다. 중국의 부상과 한국의 경제성장이 동아시아의 지역 환경의 비교적 안정된 추세를 상징한다고 한다면 다른 한편 북한의 불안은 지역안정에 대한 위협과 우려요소로서 남아있다. 한국의 통일은 일차적으로 한국인들의 국내적 문제이지만 주변의 강대국들이 공도의 노력을 통해서 남북한 대화에 안정되고 정리된 전략적 환경을 만들어준다면 이는 한반도의 상황을 지금보다 훨씬 더 관리가 가능한 상태로 만들고 북한의 지도자들로 하여금 예측할 수 없는 행동을 하지 않도록 하는데 중요한 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 러시아의 관점에서 문제는 현재 러시아의 변화하는 군사적, 안보적 이해가 다른 동아시아의 “주요 강대국”의 이해와 어느 정도 일치할 수 있을 것인가 하는 문제와 러시아가 태평양에서의 국가목표를 위해서 어느 정도의 자원을 사용할 능력과 의지를 가지고 있는가 하는 것이다.

For many decades a startling military and political weakness of China and Korea was a fundamental feature of the strategic landscape in East Asia. It was primarily this weakness that provoked since the late 19 century numerous interventions in China and Korea by the Pacific ”strong men - Japan, the USA and Russia/the Soviet Union. Almost all major conflicts in the Far East up to the late 1970s were directly on indirectly caused by competition between stronger powers for influence over weaker ones. Against such background, the 1990s became strategically speaking a sort of watershed in the regional history for since then the military and political planners in Washington, Tokyo, Moscow and other major capitals had to stem from a presumptions of a strong China and prosperous and consolidated South Korea when elaborating their strategic concepts. The regional situation became fundamentally new. The “Message on National Security of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly made public in Moscow almost on the eve of the first round of presidential elections in June, 1996 was the first official document in several years which outlined basic assessments for the military factor in Russia in a foreseeable future. The aim of the defense build-up as designed in the Message is to enable the “Armed Forces to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and to create conditions for peaceful development of Russia as a democratic, lawful and federative state and enable her to implement her international commitments including peace-making activities The Message also stresses that strategic threats in the recent years have beendrastically reduced. However, potential military threat in principles continues to exist and it even rises on regional levels. The most acute sources of conflict, as defined, are local wars and conflicts in a proximity to Russian borders and international terrorism. While the nuclear potential of the USA may be theoretically viewed a main potential threat for Russia an attack by United States is believed to be highly improbable for the time-being. 60% of the Chinese Army are designed against a hypothetical “northern threat”. Russian experts in this sense seem more moderate and they consider there is only 50% of China's Armed Forces are designed to act against Russia but still in absolute indications it looks out quite impressing. The northern front army group of China amounts 420,000 of Shengyang military district. 400,000 of the Beijing military district, plus 250,000 of the Tsinan district. All together it means 1.070,000 personal and 2,723 aircraft units. While only 320.000 and 1196 aircraft are directed against Taiwan and 370,000 and 1416 aircraft against Vietnam and India Due to Russian expert assessments China is working consistently on qualitative modernizing her missile capacity without increasing it a quantity of missiles for prudent economic consideration. The PRC has successfully performed an exercise of its new hard-fuel CSS-5 missiles which is expected to be deployed in the years to come. Currently China has about 100 missile bases approximately half of which is situated in the northern areas of the country. Typically these are bases for the CCS-4 missiles (13,000 km reach). CCS-3 (6,000 km) and CCS-2 (4,000 km). The most efficient of these missiles thus could reach all major industrial centers and major strategic targets in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. Since 1992 groups of the Chinese defense experts on a regular basis visit Russian military plants at a pretext of getting information for possible purchases of arms and equipment.In March.1996 after a new round of talks the Russian side signed a new contract for $ 2,2 billion arms deal with China details of which are unavailable.It is known that Russia goes on supplying China with its “SU-27”fighter and 24-50 machines (the number differs according to different. sources) have been already