As China has experienced political crisis after Tienanmen inci dent many scholars and specialists on Chinese matters has sug gested the possibility of disintegration of China. Of these writings, many pointed to the decentralization of resources as well as obligations from central to local govern ments and contended that the increasing resources at the dispo sal of local governments were leading to what has been termed regionalism or sectionalism. For a number of these scholars, ris ing regionalism may well lead to the disintegration of the party state, just as had occurred in Yugoslvia and the Soviet Union. Is sectionalism rising and posing a major threat to China? To address this qustion, this essay examines three issue areas. First, China's decentralized reforms have delegated more power and resources to local authorities. As a result of local authorities pur suing local interests with great vigor under the reforms, central local relations have undrgone and still going through a bumpy adaptive process. Yet as central-local relations become more for malized through fiscal and legal reforms, we anticipate that inter governmental conflicts will be accommodated within a more sta ble institutional framework. Second, the gap between the coast and the interior regions has received much attention in recent years and has been a leading cause of regional cleavages. The central government has taken this issue seriously. The fiscal reforms as well as recent policy changes will not only largely remove the preferential policies var ious coastal localities have enjoyed but will in time provide the center with more greater resources to make transfer payments to underdeveloped areas. As a result, we believe that while the coast-interior disparities may not narrow, the major causes for interior complaints have been removed. Thirdly, we believe that recent studies of China have paid too much attention to protectionist practices, which have largely sub sided. In fact, the numerous horizontal economic linkages have sprung up in recent years, helping to bring local economies clos er. As number of multinational companies are battling among them selves within china. The fierec companies have found out to their delight, if you view and treat China as a national market, it is a national market. Indeed, in an indication that not only China should not be viewed as a collection of poorly connected locali ties, a recent survey shows that multinational competition is bringing profit margins, clearly marking the globalization of China. A recent Gallup survey found that of the 15 best-known brands in China as of 1995, 14 were foreign, including Hitachi and Coca-Cola. Those who saw China as composed of many local warlords were either too beholden to the past and lacking in im agination or they simply lacked the deep pockets and experience to take on that market. To be sure, with a country as large as China, one is always going to find some evidence of local protec tionism and parochialism (just as one does in the U.S.), but one should not mistake a few trees for the forest that is gradually covering the globe. In short, the major factors leading to disintegration are being tackled and alarmists writing on regionalism in China would do well to be more empirically grounded and not mistake healthy local interests for political regionalism. Chinese local govern ments are not atomistic players forever condemned to the prison er's dilemma but neighbors that can also cooperate with each other. To be sure, ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang are well known for their political aspirations, but these are exceptions to the rule. Overall, substantial local interests can coexist with na tional integrity. Localities in China are like members of a fami ly ; they intrigue and squabble, but for now at least they 뾦nclud ing Guangdong, which trades more and more with the rest of China 뾞ppear to be at least as inward-oriented as they are out ward oriented.
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