[특집] 분쟁해결의 분위기 변화와 미ㆍ일관계의 문제점

Where U.S.-Japanese relations are concerned, two conclusions are generally not in dispute. The first concerns the importance of the relationship. Most argee that smooth U.S.-Japanese relations are essntial to the workings of both nation's security and eco nomic interests as well as those of the globe. What is also not in dispute is that the relationship often involves a great deal of disa greement and conflict and, thus, requires much attention from the governments of Japen and the U.S. Indeed, work on the caus es of and solutions to friction between the U.S. and Japan has be come a growth industry in the last decade and a half. Determining whether or not the U.S. and Japan will be able to continue along the current path of conflict resolution, which spe cific issue areas prove to be particularly troublesome, and how any fracture in the relationship will impact on the broader inter national context depends on how one assesses both the causes of problems in U.S.-Japanese relations and attempts by the two na tions to resolve them. This paper attempts to answer these ques tions by suggesting that the problem of U.S.-Japanes relations, especially the way they are managed, derive to a significant de gree from changing domestic polical forces in each nation This first concerns examining the distribution of public atti tudes on the specific issues that separate the U.S. and Japan, and the second identifies the distribution of public attitudes on what strategies leaders in both nations may employ to address areas of contention. First, while the United States and Japan have moved apart, es pecially in the decade and a half, they are likely to maintain close relations and continue to cooperate diplomatically. There may be disputes over specific foreign policy action taken by each nation, particularly as Japan exercises more autonomy in its for eign relations, but no disagreement is likely to be serious enogh to thereaten the diplomatic partnership that has evolved through out the postwar period. Next, a similar conclusion can be made relative to security re lations. On the specific issues that define U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, specifically, the size of Japan's defense budget and the number of U.S. troops to be stationed in Japan, the domestic climates in both nations accord rather well. Even on the issue of Japan accepting more of a military role in world affairs, where differences do exist, there is reason to conclude that any disputes that occur will not be disruptive. Finally, the one potentially serious problem area remains that of trade and economic issues. This is not exactly true because U. S. and Japanese opinion remains divided over the causes and sig nificance of the U.S.-Japan economic problem. One unintended but nonetheless positive consequnce of U.S.-Japan interactions in response to conflicts over trade is that American and Japanese perceptions of the problem have moved closer together in the last decade. Rather, the problem is that, at the same time, the domes tic climates in the U.S. and Japan have ostensibly changed in a way that renders maintaining the current method of conflict management onerous. Domestic forces in the U.S. provide elected officials with a political incentive to push Japan for more conces sions, while domestic forces in Japan offer strong disincentives for acquiescence. These contrary domestic climates are rein forced by American perceptions that the U.S. tends to be benevo lent in its international behavior while Japan is utterly self-inter ested. Moreover, given persistence of recession and financial cri sis in Japan and the U.S.'s inveterate economic distribution prob lem, it is likely that this negative climate has strengthened in the past few years. Unfortunately, a better informed prediction of whether economic problems will lead to a rupture in U.S.-Japa nese relations will have to wait for the availability of more re cent survey data.