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KCI등재 학술저널

미국 의회의 입법적 거부권에 관한 연구

For more than half a century in the United States, congressional or legislative vetoes have been adopted and used as a means of balancing power between the administration, especially the president and the federal parliament. Since the 1930s, when the Federal Assembly was unable to effectively exercise legislative power, it has gradually delegated legislative power to the President and the Administrative Committee, and the Federal Assembly adopted the veto as a preliminary legislative procedure to monitor the exercise of such delegated power. In general, legislative veto power refers to the delegation of legislative power to the president or administrative agency somewhat broadly, but the Congress has a veto on the exercise after the fact. In other words, this can be seen as a legislative mandate conditional on the rejection of Congress. Legislative veto power has its origins in the laying system, a precedent for the British Parliament. The return system is a system in which laws and regulations enacted by the administration are returned to the council to deliberate upon the delegation of the council, but are not recognized for effect if approval is not obtained. In the United States, legislative veto power was introduced by the Federal Assembly after the Great Depression in the 1930s to strengthen control over the administration's regulatory policies. In the 1970s, legislative veto power expanded rapidly. In the mid-1970s, Congress granted legislative vetoes to more than 100 laws. These legislative vetoes have contributed to strengthening Congress' control over the administration's regulatory policies. However, the legislative veto has caused a number of problems. First, the legislative veto system further delays the establishment of rules that are being delayed. Second, if Congress actually considers legislative veto power, the administrative committee and the parliament's competent standing committee will be sharply opposed, resulting in delays in administration. Third, criticism has been raised that the legislative veto increases the workload of Congress. Fourth, criticism has been raised that the legislative veto weakens and confuses judicial control over the administrative committee. The legislative veto, which has functioned as a strong means of control of legislative power delegation, was ruled unconstitutional in the 1983 Chadha ruling. This case is a case in which deportation of foreigners is a problem, and the background is as follows. Chadha, an East Indian, was on the verge of being deported from the country after his student visa period had elapsed. However, in 1974, Chadha requested an order to suspend deportation from the Minister of Justice based on the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act due to the difficulties of living following deportation abroad, and finally obtained the permission. However, the law gave the Senate or the House of Representatives the power to reject the Minister of Justice's decision by a simple resolution, and the House of Representatives passed a resolution rejecting the Minister's order to suspend deportation order. Eventually, in 1976, Chadha was finally ordered deported. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled by 7:2 that the legislative veto under the Immigration and Nationality Act violates the Constitution in that it violates the transfer clause (Article 1, Paragraph 7, No. 3) and the bicameral clause (Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 7 of the U.S. Constitution). In the Chadha case, it is evaluated that any form of legislative veto is unconstitutional. The ruling has shocked Congress and is expected to further affect the political process in the United States. Immediately after the Chadha ruling, the Congress came up with its own alternative. The most extreme opinion was to recognize the legislative veto as a prestigious through the revision of the current law or to deprive the Administrative Committee of its authority to enact rules at all, but it did not gain much sup

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 의회의 입법적 거부권의 역사적 전개

Ⅲ. 의회의 입법적 거부권의 문제점

Ⅳ. 차다(Chadha) 사건

Ⅴ. 미국 의회의 입법적 거부권이 한국의 법제에 주는 시사점

Ⅵ. 결론

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