학술저널
Killer Acquisitions
Killer Acquisitions
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Volume 37 No.1
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2024.0255 - 73 (19 pages)
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DOI : 10.22904/sje.2024.37.1.003
- 13
Killer-Acquisitions - acquisitions in which an acquirer abandons the product development of a target firm after having acquired it - have been a growing concern of policy makers, especially given the high mergers and acquisitions activity of Big Tech. This paper offers a survey on the recent literature on startup acquisition, and what criterions antitrust authorities should pay attention to when evaluating a merger between an incumbent and a startup.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Merger control
Ⅲ. Mergers with startups
Ⅳ. Mergers and incentives to innovate
Ⅴ. Conclusion
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