미국의 국제적 합의 체결 관행

United States Practice in Making International Commitments: Recent Developments and Their Implications

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states, “The President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.” However, the U.S. does not conclude most treaties(any agreements between the U.S. and a foreign state or body that is binding under international law) through this constitutionally defined process. The great majority of international agreements concluded by the U.S. are executive agreements which the President enters into without receiving the advice and consent of the Senate. Executive agreements are traditionally divided into three types: congressional-executive agreements, executive agreements pursuant to treaties, and sole executive agreements. In some cases, the President concludes non-binding commitments with a foreign state or body. The reliance of the U.S executive branch on non-binding commitments has accelerated. While the authority and role of the President in making international commitments have gradually expanded in the U.S., the fact that President Obama unilaterally concluded two consequential international commitments, the Paris Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, without congressional involvement, is noteworthy. These cases have triggered intense debate across the entire spectrum of international commitments under U.S. law. This article examines the types of international commitments in the U.S. legal system. This article then conducts a case study on the Paris Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Agreement to understand how and to what extent presidential exercise of unilateral authority in the current practice of U.S. international commitment-making is being carried out. Next, this article explores emerging approaches to the U.S. practice in concluding international commitments. Finally, the article draws conclusions and provides their implications.