Youth Fertility Intentions Under the Three-Child Policy : An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

三孩政策下的青年生育意愿研究—基于演化博弈理论分析

The implications of evolutionary game theory can fill the gap in existing literature that has not considered young people's adaptability to environmental factors when discussing their fertility intentions, offering a new perspective on improving these intentions. The research delves into the fundamental elements of how evolutionary games impact youth fertility desires and proposes specific mechanisms for how this influence might work under the three-child policy, using coordination game models. Drawing from the successful experiences of family planning policies, firstly, the three-child policy should have an incentive function, creating a fertility-friendly environment that encourages young people to maximize their reproductive potential. Secondly, by coordinating expectations, the policy can help young individuals select a specific equilibrium, thereby enhancing their willingness to have children. Lastly, the signaling effect of the three-child policy is to reduce the costs of childbirth, breaking the predominant mindset among contemporary youth of wanting to have children but being afraid to do so. This study broadens the perspective on how the three-child policy affects youth fertility intentions, contributing to the development of China's fertility theory and offering insights into addressing the current low fertility desires among the youth.

演化博弈理论的意涵能够弥补既有文献在讨论青年生育意愿时未能考虑青年对环境适应性因素，为改善青年生育意愿提供了新视角。研究深入剖析了演化博弈对于青年生育意愿影响的基本要素，并结合协调博弈模型提出了三孩政策背景下的青年生育意愿影响效应可能存在的具体机制。从计划生育政策成功经验来看，首先，三孩政策应具有激励功能，构建生育友好型环境，促使青年最大限度释放生育潜力；其次，三孩政策通过协调预期功能可以帮助青年们选择一个特定均衡，提升青年生育意愿；最后，三孩政策信号传递效应则是降低生育成本，破除当代青年人“想生不敢生”为主的生育心态。研究拓展了三孩政策影响青年生育意愿的视野，有利于推进中国生育理论的建构，为应对当下青年生育意愿低迷提供启示。