Five Structural Reasons Why Presidential Protection Cannot be Exclusively Handled by the Police: Focusing on the Korean Case

Purpose: As long as the state maintains a presidential system of government, the approach must be from the perspective of national security, not solely for the personal safety of the president. To achieve this, a layered security system involving overlapping agencies—such as the presidential security agency, police, and military—is crucial. However, some countries argue that the police should replace the presidential security agency directly under the president. In this study, we propose five structural analyses to explain why this claim is incorrect, fo-cusing on the case of Korea. Method: This study is an English-language extension of a paper published in Korean, and expands on the critical discourse on the transfer of presidential security services to the police, which was presented in an explor-atory manner in the original Korean paper, with a case study as the basis. Results: This study first examines the history of the Korean presidential security service from its inception to the present, examining the evolution of the “Presidential Security Service” and the “National Police” as the dedi-cated presidential security agencies. Second, it examines the overlapping security arrangements within Korean presidential security, including security areas, distances from security targets, and responsible agencies. Third, it examines the electronic warfare threats posed by cutting-edge technologies like drones, driven by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, to the presidential security service. Fourth, it analyzes the characteristics of security sys-tems in different countries, based on their political systems: “presidential” and “cabinet” systems. In the Korean case, it categorizes security duties into “personal security,” “personal protection,” and “personal protection.” It also presents the typology of terrorist organizations that pose threats to the president. Conclusion: This study analyzed five structural factors that make presidential security unsuitable for the police. First, the overlapping security system, divided into the Presidential Security Service, the National Police Agency, and the Capital Defense Command, must be maintained. Second, the police's primary responsibility is domestic security, making it difficult to effectively respond to threats linked to foreign countries, which are essential for presidential security. Third, presidential security is operated as a form of military operation rather than a matter of public security, making it difficult for the police to take the lead in presidential security. Fourth, if the police were to exclusively handle presidential security, it would be based on the Police Officers' Duties Execution Act, which mandates that officers prioritize their own safety while performing security duties. This, however, is not legally appropriate. Fifth, security and secrecy are crucial for presidential security, and the police's budget is public and recruitment channels are extensive, making it somewhat incompatible with the security-focused task of presidential security.