A Study on the Terrorism Response System in National Disasters: A Perspective on the Outbreak of War in Northeast Asia

Purpose: Terrorism, such as sabotage, leads to national disasters such as war, and the response system has changed over time. As defined by William Sturgiss Lind immediately after the end of the Cold War in 1989, it has changed from people, weapons, and information to irregular threats encompassing all of these. Now, with the 4th Industrial Revolution, it is expected that false information such as videos, images, texts, and voices will be utilized through artificial intelligence (AI) deep-fake technology, and quantum computers, biotechnology and gene editing, robotics and AI drones, and artificial neural networks will develop into new threats. Method: This study is an English extension of a paper published in Korean, and expands the national terrorism response system from the perspective of civilian cooperation to the perspective of war following a national disaster. Results: This study first identified relative poverty and radicalization as the causes of sabotage terrorism that lead to national disasters. Furthermore, it categorized the network structure of terrorist organizations through recent Internet use into security maintenance, belief systems, support groups, and organizational structure. Second, it proposed a plan to introduce CPTED, voluntary neighborhood watch groups, and detective activities as a basis for national disaster response systems, citing beneficiary pays theory, pooling theory, and economic reductionism. Furthermore, from a Northeast Asian perspective, it discussed the need for national disaster preparedness in Northeast Asia in light of the Russia-North Korea military alliance. Conclusion: First, based on the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, national counterterrorism strategies are categorized into a “threat-based approach” and a “vulnerability-based approach.” Second, by revisiting the case of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), we introduce the social conflict surrounding counterterro rism agencies' intelligence activities and the dilemma of the conflicting values of “threat intelligence” and “personal information.” Third, we examine the relationship between counterterrorism agencies and domestic politics, drawing on the examples of the FBI and CIA and proposing a model for the U.S. Office of the National Intelligence Service (ODNI).