The Effects of Group Identity in Incomplete Informtion Bargainig Situations

We examine how group identity influences the way people behave in a bargaining contex with incomplete information. Using the ultimatum bargaining game, we conduct experiments to exmine how players behave when varying offer size, decision context and proposers group identity. In an incomplete information ultimatum game, responders acceptance rates go up with offer size when the offer comes from an in-group member. However, acceptance rates do not change significantiy with offer size when the roposer is an out-group member. Subjects do not exhibit the fundamental attribution error when situational constraints are salient. Responders acceptance rates go up with offer size when the offer comes from an in-group member or an out-group member if situational constraints are made salient. Acceptace behavior changes significantly when if is possible to attribute causality to collectives instead of to the individual. The results show that group decision-making eliminates the differences in acceptance behavior based on group identity.