Education Level of Constituencies, Accountability, and Presidential Impeachment Voting in New Democracies: Evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

Education Level of Constituencies, Accountability, and Presidential Impeachment Voting in New Democracies: Evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

This paper investigates how legislators vote to presidential impeachment cases in new democracies under the pork-dominant system where party-line voting is rarely observed and politicians strive to deliver pork and patronage to constituents instead of national public policies. The president in the Philippines controls over pork and patronage network; hence it is difficult for legislators to check and balance the power of the president. Nevertheless, some legislators continuously file the impeachment process and vote to impeach the president, even though their defeat is evident. In this situation, do they vote according to the accountability of their constituencies, or loyalty to the president? With two cases of presidential impeachment vis-a-vis Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in the Philippines, this paper finds that legislators vote to impeach the president according to the education level of constituencies in regardless of their party affiliation. This finding indicates that voter demands can affect the impeachment voting in new democracies such as the Philippines.

This paper investigates how legislators vote to presidential impeachment cases in new democracies under the pork-dominant system where party-line voting is rarely observed and politicians strive to deliver pork and patronage to constituents instead of national public policies. The president in the Philippines controls over pork and patronage network; hence it is difficult for legislators to check and balance the power of the president. Nevertheless, some legislators continuously file the impeachment process and vote to impeach the president, even though their defeat is evident. In this situation, do they vote according to the accountability of their constituencies, or loyalty to the president? With two cases of presidential impeachment vis-a-vis Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in the Philippines, this paper finds that legislators vote to impeach the president according to the education level of constituencies in regardless of their party affiliation. This finding indicates that voter demands can affect the impeachment voting in new democracies such as the Philippines.