The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm (DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki (2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADB pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.
The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm (DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki (2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADB pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.
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