During the colonial era, acquiring social overhead capital was one of top priorities in the colonial authority’s ruling policy. It’s because interests from various groups got entangled in the process of accumulating and allocating social overhead capital and involved risks from investing a large fund, demand of public interest and so forth. This paper investigated how the Japanese Government-General of Korea responded to risks arising from its private railway policy and what kind of limitations it had. In the management of the Japanese Government-General of Korea’s private railway policy in the 1930s which decided to abolish limits on subsidy in the subsidy act, the Ministry of Finance and private railway capitalists could curb issuance of government bonds and maintain an annual dividend rate of 8%, respectively. In other word, the authority and capital of the Imperial Japan didnt suffer any loss. While the Government-General had to shoulder increasing burden of private railway subsidies that jumped to 7,228,000 yen in 1994, it was able to prevent the major private railway lines ‘acting as the public system’ from stopping operation. It could achieve the minimum results in its conflict with the Ministry of Finance. However, the issue of high private railway fares, one of the most important reasons behind railway purchase and what users of private railway complained about, couldnt be tackled with the stopgap measure of subsidy act revision. Demand from private railway users, who were considered beneficiaries of development or the reason of railway purchase, was the first thing that was ignored in the process of resolving conflicts between the ruling authority and capital power surrounding the ‘public’ industry.
During the colonial era, acquiring social overhead capital was one of top priorities in the colonial authority’s ruling policy. It’s because interests from various groups got entangled in the process of accumulating and allocating social overhead capital and involved risks from investing a large fund, demand of public interest and so forth. This paper investigated how the Japanese Government-General of Korea responded to risks arising from its private railway policy and what kind of limitations it had. In the management of the Japanese Government-General of Korea’s private railway policy in the 1930s which decided to abolish limits on subsidy in the subsidy act, the Ministry of Finance and private railway capitalists could curb issuance of government bonds and maintain an annual dividend rate of 8%, respectively. In other word, the authority and capital of the Imperial Japan didnt suffer any loss. While the Government-General had to shoulder increasing burden of private railway subsidies that jumped to 7,228,000 yen in 1994, it was able to prevent the major private railway lines ‘acting as the public system’ from stopping operation. It could achieve the minimum results in its conflict with the Ministry of Finance. However, the issue of high private railway fares, one of the most important reasons behind railway purchase and what users of private railway complained about, couldnt be tackled with the stopgap measure of subsidy act revision. Demand from private railway users, who were considered beneficiaries of development or the reason of railway purchase, was the first thing that was ignored in the process of resolving conflicts between the ruling authority and capital power surrounding the ‘public’ industry.
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