This paper aims to substantiate Peter Lipton’s claim that the inference to the best explanation (a kind of abduction) is to be analyzed as the inference to the loveliest explanation. I shall make clear both the relevant standard with which the goodness is measured and the candidate pool from which the goodness is measured. I shall argue that the likelihood of a hypothesis fails to be the standard. It is instead its loveliness that is the standard for the inference to the best explanation. This paper concludes with a probabilistic explication of the contrastive explanations. For the notion of the contrastive explanations is an essential part of Lipton"s analysis of the inference to the best explanation.
This paper aims to substantiate Peter Lipton’s claim that the inference to the best explanation (a kind of abduction) is to be analyzed as the inference to the loveliest explanation. I shall make clear both the relevant standard with which the goodness is measured and the candidate pool from which the goodness is measured. I shall argue that the likelihood of a hypothesis fails to be the standard. It is instead its loveliness that is the standard for the inference to the best explanation. This paper concludes with a probabilistic explication of the contrastive explanations. For the notion of the contrastive explanations is an essential part of Lipton"s analysis of the inference to the best explanation.
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