득(得, prāpti)의 실체성에 대한 세친(世親)과 유부(有部)의 논쟁38) - 󰡔구사론(俱舍論)󰡕과 󰡔순정리론(順正理論)󰡕을 중심으로 -

Arguments on the Substantiality of prāpti between Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivādin: With Special Reference to Kośa and Shunzhengli Lun

본 논문을 통해 필자는 󰡔구사론(俱舍論)󰡕과 󰡔순정리론(順正理論)󰡕에서 득(得)의 실체성을 둘러싸고 진행되는 세친(世親)과 유부(有部) 간의 대론 과정을 차례대로 소개하면서 양자 간의 주요 쟁점들을 밝힘으로써 논쟁을 복류하고 있는 양자 간의 존재론적 입장 차이를 대략적으로 가늠해 보았다. 유부는 ‘다르마의 발생 원인’[所得法生因], ‘성자와 이생의 존재의 차이를 세우는 원인’[建立因]의 ‘작용’을 들어 득의 실체성을 계속 주장한다. 하지만 세친은 수행자가 지닌 종자들의 상태의 차이에 따라 ‘번뇌’와 ‘선법’의 ‘소유’와 ‘무소유’를 설명함으로써 득은 실체가 아니라 수행자의 특수한 상태를 지칭하는 ‘언표’일 뿐임을 천명한다. 하지만 세친이 종자를 통해 득의 실체성을 해체하게 되자 중현(衆賢)은 역으로 종자라는 언표를 논리적으로 해체함으로써 득의 실체성을 옹호하려 한다. 이러한 논쟁을 통해 양자 간의 존재론적 입장 차이가 간접적으로 드러난다. 유부는 성자와 이생 간에는 메울수 없는 질적 차이가 존재한다는 모종의 본질주의적 사유를 견지하고 있었으며, 전찰나와 후찰나의 다르마는 근본적으로 동일한 본질을 가지고 있어야만 한다는 사유로 인해 양자 간의 ‘어중간한 동일성’과 ‘미묘한 차이’를 주장하는 종자설을 비판하였다. 하지만 종자라는 언표’는 과정의 관점에서 변화를 인식할 때 합리적으로 설명될 수 있는 표현이다. 세친은 종자와 후찰나 다르마 간의 ‘약한 의미의 불연속’을 변화 과정의 계기로 이해하고 있다는 점에서 연기의 과정적 측면에 주목한 사 상가로 볼 수 있다.

This paper is a research of the arguments on the substantiality of prāpti between Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra. The prāpti is a philosophical topic in Sarvāstivādin which has been criticized in Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu. In ‘the chapter of the organs’(indriya-nirdeśa), Vasubandhu, at first, has presented the general definition of prāpti. According to him, Sarvāstivādin regard the prāpti as a substance(dravya) because of its effects of ‘the arising cause(utpattihetu) of dharmas’ and ‘the determinant cause of [beings’] state’(vyavasthāhetu). Secondly, He has pointed out the contradiction of the concept of prāpti as a substance itself and has denied its substantiality. Finally, he has presented the new expression, that is to say ‘seed’(bīja) which replace the prāpti. ‘Seed’ is an metaphorical expression which significate the complex of five skandhas, capable of produce the fruit either immediately or gradually in the process of the evolution(pariṇāviśeṣa) of the series(saṃtati). It is not a substance but dharma as a designation(prajñapti-dharma) which indicate the state(avasthā) of a person(āśraya). Against Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra firstly redefine the effects of prāpti. For him, prāpti is undoubtedly a substance because it is ‘the keeping cause(avipraṇāśa-kāraṇa) of dharmas’ and ‘the sign of distinction’(jñāna-cihna) which is inclusive of ‘the determinant cause of [beings’] state’(vyavasthāhetu) presented by Vasubandu in Abhidharmakośa. Secondly, By reexaminating so-called ‘the Doctrine of Seed’ he has logically deconstructed the notion of ‘seed’ and pointed out the contradiction of the expressions which indicate the states of ‘seed’, for example ‘perfect destruction of seed’, ‘possession of seed’. For him, ‘Seed’ is an absurd notion in logic because of the ambiguity that the seed of an dharma is not simultaneous nor successive with the dharma. Especially, the expression ‘imperfect destruction’ of good dharma or passion’s seed’ has been presented as a typical example of its ambiguity. Because he cannot accept the third state between destruction and possession. Finally, After negation of ‘seed’, he has reconstructed the prāpti as a substance. The arguments on prāpti and bīja between Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra seem to me a moment of exposing the differences in their ontological positions. Firstly, Vasubandhu cannot accept the substantiality of prāpti in Sarvāstivādin. Their notion of prāpti implicate a kind of essentialist preposition that there is a intrinsic difference between saint(ārya) and mediocrity(pṛthagjana) as we can clearly see from ‘the determinant cause of [beings’] state’(vyavasthāhetu). Secondly, Saṃghabhadra, on the contrary, cannot accept the ambiguity of Vasubadhu s bīja. According to so-called ‘The Doctrine of Being as Substance of Dharmas in All Three Moments’ in Sarvāstivādin, a dharma has a same essence(svabhāva) either in a former or later moment(kṣaṇa). Accordingly, ‘the Doctirne of Seed’ that can approve a borderline concept, i.e. ‘seed’ between dharmas in a former and later moments seems to him a danger that may deny the identity between the former and the latter. In conclusion, while the position of Vasubandhu as ‘a master of Sautrāntika’(Sūtrakāra) is relatively nominalistic, Saṃghabhadra as a master of Sarvāstivādin is more realistic, close to essentialist philosophy.