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SCOPUS 학술저널

The Scope for Policy Coordination between the United States and Europe: Implications of Asymmetric Labor Markets

The Scope for Policy Coordination between the United States and Europe: Implications of Asymmetric Labor Markets

This paper emphasizes the structural differences in the American and European. labor markets and examines the implications of these asymmetries for the scope of policy coordination between these economies. Strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal policies are analyzed as a game between a country with real wage rigidity(Europe) and a country with nominal wage rigidity (U.S.). The paper presents simple examples which show that the nature of the noncooperative equilibrium in this asymmetric framework depends on the strategy variables chosen by the countries. Policy coordination is redundant if money supplies are the only instruments used by both players. The noncooperative fiscal policy game is inefficient, and policy coordination becomes redundant again when both monetary and fiscal policies are employed. These results illustrate that an appropriate assignment of policy instruments can be a substitute to policy coordination in generating an efficient solution to the` international policy game.

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