학술저널
Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping?
Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping?
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Journal of Economic Integration
- 제9권 제2호
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1994.06198 - 213 (16 pages)
- 0
Why has the GATT dispute settlement process been so ineffective in disciplining the use of antidumping; what are the sources of this ineffectiveness and the likelihood that the process will become effective in the future? The paper concludes that GATT enforcement is not likely to provide effective discipline over national use of antidumping. Both the bureaucratic and the legal momentum of the GATT dispute settlement process are toward innocuous findings of procedural error that can be corrected without lifting the antidumping order under review. A legalistic approach implies a protectionist answer.
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