
Quotas and Quality in an International Duopoly
- George Sweeney Henry Thompson T. Randolph Beard
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Journal of Economic Integration
- 제12권 제2호
- 등재여부 : KCI등재
- 1997.06
- 180 - 205 (26 pages)
This paper examines possible adjustments to a change in a binding quota in the context of an international duopoly. Consumers directly value embodied quality of goods, which is chosen simultaneously with quantity, and before quantity in a sequential model. Possible responses to a small change in a binding quota are derived. The same three types of equilibria occur in the simultaneous and sequential models. Foreign quality downgrading can occur if domestic quality falls, and is more likely starting with a low quantity of high quality imports. Domestic quality and quantity respond in opposite directions. Welfare effects are discussed.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Fundamental Assumptions of the Model
Ⅲ. Simultaneous Choice of Quality and Quantity
Ⅳ. Simultaneous Choice with Uniform Distribution of Consumer Types
Ⅴ. Sequential Choice: Quality Before Quantity
Ⅵ. Welfare Analysis
Ⅶ. Conclusion