
Can a Periodic VER Raise Importing Country Welfare?
Can a Periodic VER Raise Importing Country Welfare?
- Omer Gokcekus Edward Tower
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Journal of Economic Integration
- 제12권 제4호
- 등재여부 : KCI등재
- 1997.12
- 485 - 504 (20 pages)
Several authors have argued that if exporting firms anticipate a voluntary export restriction in a future period, and they expect VERs to be allocated in proportion to past exports, then they have an incentive to dump in the earlier period. In this paper we ask: How does a regime characterized by periodic VERs affect aggregate welfare, consumer welfare and import-competing producer welfare in the importing country? We discover paradoxically, that the answers are all uncertain. However, such a regime always shrinks worldwide efficiency, and normally, for the importer it shrinks aggregate welfare and consumer welfare and raises producer welfare. (JEL Classification: F13)
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Why Might Government Impose a Periodic VER?
Ⅲ. The Setup
Ⅳ. The Small Japanese Industry Case
Ⅴ. The Large Japanese Industry and Linear Market
Ⅵ. The Large Japanese Industry with Nonlinear Demands and Supplies
Ⅶ. Conclusion