On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration
On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Journal of Economic Integration
- 제18권 제3호
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2003.09506 - 529 (24 pages)
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The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of political asymmetries on a FTA and a CU. I have shown that either a higher lobbying sensitivity to the foreign firm or a more susceptibility of politicians to lobbying are sufficient to lead to a higher tariff protection at the individual country level. Under a CU, firms may dislike any form of political dominance in the common trade policy unless politicians do not discriminate against foreign foreign lobbyists significantly. In contrast, under a FTA, if politicians are very susceptible to lobbying, the results apperar to be ambiguous.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. A Two-Stage Model
Ⅲ. The Political Environments for the Co-operation in Lobbying
Ⅳ. Co-operative Lobbying in a FTA or a CU-An Example of the Symmetric Case with Unbalanced Bargaining Power
Ⅴ. Conclusion
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