상세검색
최근 검색어 전체 삭제
다국어입력
즐겨찾기0
145196.jpg
KCI등재 학술저널

Fiscal Consolidation: An Exercise in the Methodology of Coordination

Fiscal Consolidation: An Exercise in the Methodology of Coordination

This paper outlines a new methodology for the study of international policy coordination, which builds on two separate approaches previously used in the literature: optimal simple rules, and game-theoretic analysis. The new approach is illustrated by using the example of a changed target for the debt-income ratio in the G-3. The results suggest that there are few policy externalities when only fiscal policy is coordinated, whilst coordination of both fiscal and monetary policy results in substantial externalities and welfare improvements. Our findings reflect the fact that, unlike earlier studies, we focus on the strategic interaction between (domestic) policy makers, as well as the standard exchange rate and interest rate transmission mechanisms.

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. A Model of the G3 Economies

Ⅲ. Analysing Fiscal Shocks in International Models

Ⅳ. Fiscal Policy Coordination

Ⅴ. Conclusions