학술저널
International R&D Tournaments and Industrial Policy
International R&D Tournaments and Industrial Policy
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Journal of Economic Integration
- 제22권 제2호
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2007.06320 - 338 (19 pages)
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This paper provides a unified approach to study the influence of uncertainty and spillovers on the direction of R&D policy when firms engage in international R&D competition. When the reward to the winner is exogenously given, it is shown that whether a government will tax or subsidize its firm is sensitive to the type of uncertainty that characterizes the R&D process. When the reward to the winner is endogenously determined by R&D spending, the direction of optimal policy is not only sensitive to the type of uncertainty, but also sensitive to the degree of spillovers.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. Symmetric Equilibrium
Ⅳ. Endogenous Reward to the Winner
Ⅴ. Conclusion
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