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SCOPUS 학술저널

Strategic Export Policy in the Presence of Subcontracting

Strategic Export Policy in the Presence of Subcontracting

This paper examines the optimal export policies when ex ante negotiation over subcontract manufacturing occurs between two competing international-firms. It show that it could be optimal for the exporting country to adopt either a different or a parallel trade policy between the two exporting goods (the final product and the subcontracted product). However, a different trade policy that taxes the finalproduct export and subsidizes the subcontracted-product export is not ever optimal. When the exporting firm is a pure subcontractor, taxing the single export (subcontracted product) becomes the only optimal trade policy of the exporting country. Morever, the exporting country imposes a less aggressive trade policy in response given that the importing country inflicts a more aggressive trade policy.

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Model

Ⅲ. Comparative Statics

Ⅳ. Optimal Trade Policy of the Exporting Country

Ⅴ. A Pure Subcontractor

Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks

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