학술저널
Capital Ownership and the Political Economy of Free Trade Agreements
Capital Ownership and the Political Economy of Free Trade Agreements
- 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
- Journal of Economic Integration
- 제23권 제2호
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2008.06360 - 389 (30 pages)
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This article examines the political economy of free trade agreements. It assumes that, unlike labour, capital in two countries is owned and represented by the same lobby group. Using a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, factors affecting the likelihood of political parties and lobby groups supporting free trade agreements are investigated. The effects of free trade agreements on tariffs facing non-member countries are also examined.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. Analysis
Ⅳ. Conclusion
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