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SCOPUS 학술저널

Monetary Policy and National Divergences in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

Monetary Policy and National Divergences in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

In spite of the structural heterogeneity of the Eurozone, the main objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to preserve price stability for the union as a whole, and she pays full attention to Union-wide inflation and output, neglecting national divergences. In this paper, we wonder, at a theoretical level, about the social loss associated with such a “centralized” objective, and we show the existence of an “optimal” contract for the common central bank, which ensures a correct stabilization of national magnitudes. Furthermore, we show that social welfare does not necessarily improve if the ECB worries about inflation divergences without being concerned about output divergences in the Union.

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Model

Ⅲ. The Cost of a Centralized Monetary Policy

Ⅳ. Introducing Aversion to Divergences in the Central Bank Loss Function

Ⅴ. The Optimal Contract with Independent Central Bank Preferences for Output and Inflation Stabilization

Ⅵ. Second-Best Contracts for Monetary Policy

Ⅶ. Conclusion

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