传统朱子学中“理”是“太极”、“天理”，是最高范畴，无情意、无造作，不具有活动性。但在奠定朝鲜性理学基础的四端七情论争中，退溪、高峯、栗谷却频繁使用了“理发”一词，明显与朱子的理论相悖。特别是退溪在主张“理发说”的同时，构建了“理动说”、“理到说”，从而对理之能动性进行了系统的阐释。高峯和栗谷虽然也使用“理发”一词，却与退溪的阐释大相径庭。本论文在考察退溪对理之能动性认识的同时，整理高峯、栗谷对理之能动性的认识，比较三位学者对理之能动性理解的差异，以及这些差异对三位学者理论思想的影响，梳理“理”概念在韩国本土化的进程与特点，展现朱子学在东亚的多元化发展脉络。
In orthodox Zhu Xi’s philosophy, Li, the concept of the highest level, is Tai-ji (the supreme ultimate) and Tianli (principle of Heaven). It is of no affection and volition, no creative power, and no activeness. During the Four Seven Debate, which forms the foundation of Joseon Neo-Confucianism, Toegye, Gobong and Yulgok frequently uses the term ‘Li-fa’. Obviously, the term contradicts with Zhu Xi’s thought. Toegye, on the base of ‘Li-fa’ theory, even proposes the ‘Li-dong’ theory and the ‘Li-dao’ theory. Thus, Toegye systematically interprets the activeness of Li. Nevertheless, Gobong and Yulgok’s interpretations on ‘Li-fa’ differ from Toegye’s, thought they used the same term. The article examines Toegye, Gobong and Yulgok’s interpretations on the activeness of Li, and explores the differences among their interpretations. In such a case, the article shows how their different interpretations has influenced their later philosophical thoughts. It also reveals the characteristics of the indigenization process of Li concept in Jeseon and the diverse ways of development of Zhu Xi’s philosophy in East Asia.
1. 绪论
2. 退溪：理发说的含义与“理动” “理到”
3. 高峯：对理发说的理解与批判
4. 栗谷：“理无为”原则的强化和宇宙论的根据
5. 结论