Dual process theories suppose two kinds of systems in human thought. One is connected to evolutionary adaptation (system 1), whereas the other is connected to normative rationality (system 2). Processing is implicit in the former, whereas it is explicit in the latter. It is discussed whether optimal data selection, namely, the selection so that the information gain or epistemic utility as to the truth of a conditional rule is maximized, is in system 1 or system 2. I provide some evidences that it is not so implicit than it is thought to be. However, because it is not so flexible, although it is normative if its goal is to describe the world, that it is triggered in the task where the application of propositional logic is needed. It is concluded that, although it is located in system 1, it has not gene installed goals but meme installed goals.
INTRODUCTION
DUAL PROCESS THEORIES AND RATIONALITY
OPTIMAL DATA SELECTION
IS OPTIMAL DATA SELECTION IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT?
GOAL-STRUCTURE AND IMPLICATION FOR RATIONALITY
WHERE IS THE OPTIMAL DATA SELECTION SET OUT IN DUAL PROCESS THEORIES?
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES